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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we discuss popular market and default risks modeling. We highlight some 
shortcomings. Then, we present the prospect and cumulative prospect theories. We discuss 
again the previous models under behavioral finance framework and get different results. 
Based on these results, we propose a new Value at Risk measure and make suggestions on 
other measures. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
 
In past decades, market and credit risks have become a major concern for regulators and 
financial companies. Their impact, frequency and spread have prompted banks and 
regulators to manage and control them in order to prevent bankruptcy and preserve the 
financial system stability. After the Great Depression, banks are regulated by the Glass 
Steagall act in 1933 and Bretton Woods agreements in 1944. From early 1990, they mostly 
follow the Basel guidelines. Unlike regulations in the mid twentieth century, which were 
mostly restrictions on financial transactions, Basel Accords are recommendations 
regarding the Regulatory Capital. In this framework, internationally active banks are 
allowed to operate either with the standard approach or with the internal rating-based 
approach. 
Regarding the internal rating-based regime, many models for assessing risk are 
proposed in academe and in the industry. In practice, the Value at Risk (VaR) has been 
adopted as the standard for market risk and most of the biggest banks have their own 
model for credit risk. At portfolio level, the main models used to assess credit risk are: JP 
Morgan’s CreditMetrics, Moody’s KMV, Credit Suisse’s CreditRisk+ and McKenzy & 
Company’s Credit Portfolio View. Despite precautionary measures taken in recent years, 
banks and financial system aren’t yet sound. The demise of some wall street giants as Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers and the record fall in macroeconomics indicators in many 
countries are illustrations of  some deficiencies present in the current regulatory 
framework. The assessment of risk poses many challenges in, mainly within the internal 
rating based approach, both the modeling process and the estimation technique. 
Our intention in this paper isn’t to give exhaustively the causes of models’ failure. Rather, 
we try to highlight some flaws in the modeling process and in classical finance theory. 
Then, under behavioral finance theory, present a new methodology which circumvents 
partly those imperfections. 
First of all, we define what do market and credit risk mean and  highlight features 
of some models widely used in the industry. Secondly, we analyze traditional estimation 
techniques for both parametric and non parametric models. Thirdly, we introduce 
behavioral finance and present the cumulative prospect theory. In chapter fourth, we talk 
about modeling under behavioral finance assumptions. In the fifth chapter, we analyze the 
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implications of irrational behavior to Value at Risk and probability of default. Then, we 
present a simple Value at Risk model estimator based on judgment and some usually non 
accounted facts in estimation. In the end, we draw some concluding remarks. 
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 Chapter 2. 
Market and credit risks models 
 
 
1. Market risk 
 
Market risk is the possibility of losses in on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet positions 
driven by market prices fluctuations. Markets risks can be distinguished in: 
• Risks related to interest rate instruments in trading book 
• Stock prices risks in trading book 
• Foreign exchange and commodities risks 
There are many models for assessing market risk. But, due to their importance, we  only 
consider the Value at Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall. 
 
1.1. Value at Risk 
Value at risk is traced back to early 1990s when JP Morgan’s chairman demanded a report, 
“Report 4.15”, summarizing market movements and providing the bank’s risk for the next 
day. 
In a financial point of view, it is the margin needed to cover both expected loss and 
unexpected loss. 
From a mathematical standpoint VaR  is, given a confidence level and a time horizon, the 
maximum loss that a portfolio incurs based on the distribution of price changes over a 
given historical period. This is formulated as follows: 
 
Discrete case 
Let ܺ b  a dis rete rando  ݔ௜ א Թ, ݅ ൌ 1
ݔଵ ൑ ݔଶ ൑ ݔଷ ൑ ڮ ൑ ݔ௡ is the ordered sequence of ݔ௜; Զሾܺ ൌ ݔ௜ሿ is the probability mass 
function and ߙ is the confidence level; 
e c m variable with observations , 2, 3, … , ݊; 
then 
ܸܴܽ ൌ െݔ௞כ; 
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where 
݇כ ൌ ݉݅݊൛݇ א Գ| ∑ Զሾܺ ൌ ݔ௜ሿ
௞ିଵ
௜ୀଵ ൏ ߙ ൑ ∑ Զሾܺ ൌ ݔ௜ሿ
௞
௜ୀଵ ൟ. 
 
 
Continuous case 
Let ܺ be a continuous random variable; Զሾܺ ൑ ݔሿ the probability density function and ߙ 
the confidence level 
then 
ܸܴܽ ൌ െ݂݅݊ሼݔ א Թ| Զሾܺ ൑ ݔሿ ൒ ߙ  ሽ.1 
 
 
Value at Risk is recommended by Bank for International Settlements and the Group 
of Thirty as a good method for market risk mitigation. Conceptually, VaR is simple. 
Although recently some doubt has been cast on its validity, it remains one of the best 
practice for risk management. From a managerial viewpoint, it’s the required margin to 
cover partially potential losses. Value at Risk is particularly important from the regulatory 
standpoint in the sense that it’s a tool to protect depositors and preserve financial stability. 
VaR and other risk measures are becoming more and more demanded (especially when it 
comes to control proprietary trading on a rational basis) as the financial environment is 
growing in complexity. 
Given that VaR is not always sub-additive outside the Gaussian world, which means 
that the benefit of diversification is mitigated (Since it’s determined on a consolidated 
basis), coherent models such as expected shortfall have been proposed. 
 
1.2. Expected shortfall 
Provided a ܸܴܽ with confidence level ߙ the expected shortfall is defined as follows: 
 
ܧܵ ൌ െ
൫ॱሾX|Xஸି௏௔ோഀ  ሿି௏௔ோഀ  ሺఈିԶሾିX|Xஸି௏௔ோഀ  ሿሻ൯
ఈ
. 
 
This measure has two main properties. First, it’s more conservative than VaR. Second, it 
captures the effect of diversification. Which means that a diversified portfolio would imply 
less capital cushion rather than more capital cushion. 
                                                 
4 
 
1 Note that the continuous and discrete cases can be consolidate to ܸܴܽ ൌ െݏݑ݌ሼݔ א Թ| Զሾܺ ൑ ݔሿ ൑ ߙሽ. 
 2. Credit risk 
 
Credit risk is “the possibility of loss incurred as result of a borrower or a counterparty 
failing to meet its financial obligations” (Credit Suisse group, 2002). 
As it appears from this definition, credit risk permeates all financial contracts and is 
one of the main concern. The literature on credit risk measurement is vast. In recent times, 
it has shown a particular vigor due to a more complex environment and the need of pricing 
more and more complicated financial instruments (for instance, Credit Default Swap). The 
credit risk methodologies, although different from an estimation viewpoint, all address one 
or more of the following risk aspects: 
 
• Probability of default 
• Loss given default  
• Exposure at default  
 
Borrowing the classification in CreditMetrics™—Technical Document (2007), we can 
distinguish the techniques for estimating the probability of default in: 
 
• Accounting analytics methods 
• Statistical methods 
• Option theoretic methods 
 
Accounting analytics rely on financial statements measures such as coverage ratios, 
earnings, cash flows etc... There are then adjusted by an expert judgment to obtain ratings. 
The prominent are S&P and Moody’s ratings. 
 
Statistical methods can be distinguished in: 
• Discriminant analysis, a combination of variables that determines default state is 
found. For instance Edward Altman’s zeta-scores 
• Regression analysis, a combination of variables that estimates the default 
likelihood is found. For instance McKenzy’s Credit Portfolio View 
• Neural network  
5 
 
 Option theoretic methods consider that the company’s equity is a call option on the 
asset value and that default occurs when asset value hits a given threshold (value of the 
obligation). The likelihood of default is derived from that assumption. The most notable 
model is Moody’s KMV. 
In the following, we illustrate some popular portfolio credit risk models for estimating the 
likelihood of default.  
 
2.1. Merton model 
Model assumptions: 
1. Perfect market: 
• No transactions costs, taxes and indefinite divisibility of assets. 
• Sufficient number of investors who can trade, at the market price, as much 
as they desire. 
• Existence of a market of borrowing and lending at the same rate. 
• No short-sale constraints 
2. Continuous trading 
3. Modigliani-Miller theorem holds 
4. Flat term structure 
5. Firm value follows a diffusion process 
݀ ௧ܸ ൌ ሺߤ ௧ܸ െ ܿሻ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ ௧ܸ݀ݖ; 
 
 
where ௧ܸ is the firm value at time ݐ, ܿ is the dividend pay-out (in dollar), ߤ is the 
annualized expected rate of return, ߪ is the volatility. 
Furthermore, for technical tractability of the model, it’s assumed that the capital structure 
is simple (one class of homogenous debt, say ܦ at time ݐ, and the residual claim). 
 
By Itô lemma and for ܿ ൌ 0 we have  
lnሺ ௧ܸሻ െ lnሺ ଴ܸሻ ൌ ቀߤ െ
ଵ
ଶ
ߪଶቁ ݐ ൅ ߪݖ௧; 
 
 
thus  
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Զሾ ௧ܸ ൑ ܦሿ ൌ Φ ቆെ
୪୬ሺ௏బሻି୪୬ሺ஽ሻାቀఓି
భ
మ
ఙమቁ௧
ఙ√௧
ቇ. 
 
2.2. Moody’s KMV EDF 
It’s a tool to obtain the probability of default (EDF) where technical assumptions in Merton 
model are made more realistic. The model considers: 
• Complex capital structure 
• Default can happen at any time before maturity 
• The default point is firm specific, depends on firm’s liability structure and it is 
derived empirically 
• The distance to default (DD) is matched to the probability of default via an 
empirical distribution 
 
By definition  
 
ܦܦ ൌ
୪୬൬ ೇ೟
ವ೟శೌ೟
൰ାቀఓିభ
మ
ఙమቁ௧
ఙ√௧
; 
 
where ܽ are cash outflows per unit time (interest payments, coupons and dividends).   
Then,Vasicek and Kealhofer found that 
ܧܦܨ ؄ 2Φሺെܦܦሻ. 
 
 
Some claimed features of the model are: 
• EDF is a forward-looking measure 
• EDF is an actual probability of default 
• Non statistical fitted model, based on cause and effect 
 
2.3. CreditMetrics 
Credit metrics is mainly a methodology of computing credit risk from already computed 
default probabilities. Transition matrices are given by other entities like S&P and Moody’s. 
The value payoff is derived by discounting at the corresponding forward zero curves 
(which is derived from zero coupon prices). 
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2.4. Jarrow Turnbull model 
Firms are grouped into classes, default state is absorbing and the default frequency is 
assumed to follow a Poisson process (or a Cox process, i.e. Poisson process with stochastic 
inten ty). si
Let  ௧ܰ be the default frequency of a class during the time interval ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ; and ߣሺݐሻ, the 
annualized mean default frequency. ߣሺݐሻ is a function of default free interest rates and an 
equity market index. 
Then ௧ܰ has probability mass function 
  
ሺఒሺ௧ሻ∆௧ሻ೙
௡!
݁ି  ఒሺ௧ሻ∆௧  ݐ א ሾ0, ∞ሻ. 
 
 
Let ܫ௧ be the default indicator at time t; ߬ the waiting time until default occurs during the 
time interval ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ 
ܫ௧ ൌ ൜
1, ݂݅ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ
0, ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
 
 
߬ is a stopping time such that 
Զሾ߬ ൐ ݐሿ ൌ Զሾ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ݐሿ ൌ ∏   
ሺఒሺ௧೔ሻ∆௧ሻబ
଴!
݁ି  ఒሺ௧೔ሻ∆௧௞௜ୀଵ ; 
 
 
where 
݇ א Գ ܽ݊݀ ݇∆ݐ ൌ ݐ 
 
 
i.e. 
Զሾ߬ ൐ ݐሿ ൌ   ݁ି  ∑ ఒሺ௧೔ሻ∆௧
ౡ
౟సభ  
 
 
which is equivalent to 
Զሾ߬ ൑ ݐሿ ൌ 1 െ   ݁ି  ∑ ఒሺ௧೔ሻ∆௧
ౡ
భ . 
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The above function is the exponential distribution. Since default state is absorbing, the 
likelihood of default before time ݐ, Զሾ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ݐሿ, is 
1 െ   ݁ି  ∑ ఒሺ௧೔ሻ∆௧
ౡ
భ . 
 
 
By independence of default events we have 
Զሾ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ݐ ൅ ∆ݐሿ 
ൌ Զሾ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ݐሿԶൣ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧  
 
 
Which implies that 
Զൣ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧ ൌ ݁ఒሺ௧ሻ∆௧                                                                               
 
 
thus 
Զൣ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧ ൌ 1 െ ݁ఒሺ௧ሻ∆௧, an Exponential Distribution 
 
 
We have 
ln൫Զൣ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧൯ ൌ ߣሺݐሻ∆ݐ 
 
 
For ߣሺݐሻ∆ݐ small (i.e. ∆ݐ ՜ 0), we have 
Զൣ݊݋ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧ ؄ 1 െ ߣሺݐሻ∆ݐ 
 
 
we deduce that 
Զൣ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐ ݀ݑݎ݅݊݃ ሺݐ, ݐ ൅∆ݐሿ൧ ؄ ߣሺݐሻ∆ݐ. 
 
 
So, default is completely characterized by the hazard function, ߣሺݐሻ. 
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2.5. Credit risk+ 
Assets in a portfolio are divided by sectors. Where a sector is a group of  obligors affected 
by the same main factor (like domiciliation in a country). The main assumption in this 
model is that asset default rate is assumed to be binomially distributed. The probability 
generating function is used as a dev  to compute aggregate default. ice
Granted a portfolio of N obligors, Զ௜ the annual probability of obligor ݅ defaulting; the 
probability generating function of obligor ݅ is 
 ௜࣪ሺݐሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ  Զ௜ሻݐ଴ ൅  Զ௜ݐଵ ൌ 1 ൅ Զ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻ; |ݐ| ൏ 1. 
 
 
The model offers two measures according to whether the default state is stable or 
changing. 
 
For constant default rate 
By independence of default between different obligors, the probability generating function 
of the portfolio is 
 
࣪ሺtሻ ൌ ෑ  ௜࣪ሺݐሻ ൌ
N
୧ୀଵ
ෑሺ1 ൅ Զ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻሻ
N
୧ୀଵ
 
 
ln൫࣪ሺtሻ൯ ൌ ෍ lnሺ1 ൅ Զ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
 
For Զ௜ small 
lnሺ1 ൅ Զ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻሻ ൌ Զ௜ሺݐ െ 1ሻ 
 
 
thus 
 
࣪ሺtሻ ൌ e∑ Զ೔ሺ௧ିଵሻ
ಿ
೔సభ ൌ eሺ௧ିଵሻ ∑ Զ೔
ಿ
೔సభ ൌ eሺ௧ିଵሻఓe௧ఓeିఓ ൌ ∑   ୣ
షഋఓ
௡!
௡
ݐ௡ஶ௡ୀ଴ , 
 
10 
 
where ∑ Զ௜ே௜ୀଵ ൌ ߤ is the expected number of defaults of the sector (representative 
obligor). 
 
We deduce that the portfolio probability of ݊ defaults is 
 
Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏሿ ൌ   ୣ
షഋఓ
௡!
௡
, a Poisson Distribution. 
 
Empirically, the average default probability ߤ  is random. This is due to background 
factors such as the state of the economy. We mean that an obligor will more likely default 
in an economy downturn than in an economy upturn. Thus, the variability of default rate 
must be taken into account in assessing the portfolio probability of default. This leads to 
the determination of probability with changing default rate. 
 
For variable default rate 
We have X࣪ሺtሻ ൌ ∑ ݐ௡ஶ௡ୀ଴ Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏ|ܺሿ ൌ eሺ௧ିଵሻ௑, where ܺ is the variable default rate 
and ࣪ ሻ is the conditional probability enerating function. Xሺt g
Let fሺxሻ be the density function of X, then the unconditional probability generating 
function is 
࣪ሺzሻ ൌ ׬ eሺ௧ିଵሻ௫ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴ . 
 
 
Assuming that ܺ~Γሺߙ, ߚሻ, i.e. fሺxሻ ൌ ୣ
షೣ
ഁ ୶ഀషభ
ఉഀ୻ሺఈሻ
, we have 
 
࣪ሺtሻ ൌ න eሺ௧ିଵሻ௫ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴
 
 
ൌ ሺ1 െ qሻఈ ෍ ൫௡ାఈିଵ௡ ൯ݍ
௡ݐ௡
ஶ
௡ୀଵ
, by the generalized binomial theorem 
 
where 
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ݍ ൌ ఉ
ଵାఉ
. 
 We deduce that 
Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ qሻఈ൫௡ାఈିଵ௡ ൯ݍ
௡, a Negative Binomial Distribution. 
 
 
2.6. Portfolio-view (by Financial Analytics) 
The idea is that the likelihood to default of a company, in a specific industry, depends 
mostly on a combination of macroeconomic factors. Macro-variables can be growth rate of 
the economy, interest rates, foreign exchange rate, unemployment, etc...(Wilson, 1997). 
The default rate  in the sector is given by a  logistic distribution. Then, to obtain the 
company default probability, the default probability in the sector is accommodated to 
com s c ors. pany pecific fa t
Let  ܺ௧௜  |݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊  be the main ݊ macro variables affecting the sector at a given time ݐ; 
ܽ the vector of parameters. We have 
Զ ൌ ଵ
ଵା௘ሺೊ೟ሻ
 
; 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ܽᇱ ൬
1
ܺ௧
൰ ൅ ߝ௧ 
where 
 
and 
ܺ௧ ൌ ሺܺ௧ଵ, ܺ௧ଶ, … , ܺ௧௡ሻᇱ ; ܽ ൌ ሺܽ଴, ܽଵ, … , ܽ௡ሻᇱ. 
 
 
 ߝ௧ are assumed to be multivariate normal distributions with mean Ο and variance-
covariance matrix Σ. 
Then, the probability of default of an individual is given by adapting Զ to the individual’s 
characteristics such as size and capital structure. 
 
 Summarizing, the main feature of structural models is that the probability of default 
is drawn from a normal distribution, under some conditions; and they allow us to mark to 
market the default risk. 
12 
 
Whereas the reduced form models depend on default history of a pool of companies. The 
probability of default is obtained from an Exponential Distribution in Jarrow Turnbull 
case, Poisson Distribution and Negative Binomial Distribution in Credit Suisse model. 
Financial analytics derives the probability of default from a Logistic Distribution. 
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Chapter 3. 
Estimation under classical finance 
 
 
The main challenge resides in statistical estimation. Any measurement process is separable 
in three phases: 
1. Investigation of data statistical properties 
2. Estimation of distribution function  
3. Computation 
In practice, all methods rely on some regularities found in financial data. Some stylized 
facts commonly met in stocks’ prices are: 
• Low autocorrelation of returns 
• Significant autocorrelation of squared returns 
• Negative skewness 
• Fat tails 
 
Since the remarkable work by Bachelier, “Theory della speculation”, there is an 
extensive literature describing statistical features of financial prices. Bachelier describes 
prices fluctuations as independent and Gaussian distributed. 
Over the past decade, ARCH type models have been the prevailing way of 
representation of financial prices. The main feature of price behavior captured by arch 
models, Engle (1982), is volatility clustering (that is, large price changes are followed by 
large price changes and small price changes are followed by small prices changes) with 
undefined direction. GARCH model renders arch more flexible by including long lag 
length. Other variants like FIGARCH are designed to accommodate the long memory (that 
is the longest cycle is proportional to the sample) and structural breaks observed in some 
data. 
 
1. Non parametric models 
 
According to this methodology there is not an a priori distribution. The goal is to determine 
an empirical distribution. Non parametric methods rely heavily on the strong law of large 
numbers, I mean, on the i.i.d and stationary assumptions. This is mostly met when 
14 
 
determining losses distribution and transition matrices in credit risk models such as 
Creditmetrics. Unfortunately, the assumption of independency is called into question by 
the cyclicities that often appear in financial phenomena. The dependency and even the long 
dependency are well supported by Mandelbrot’s works with Van Ness on Fractional 
Brownian Motion (FBM); and with Fischer and Calvet on Multifractality of Asset Returns 
(MMAR). 
The assumption of stationarity is inconsistent with structural changes in the 
economy, in sectors of the economy and in businesses. For instance, this is illustrated by 
the fluctuations of S&P 500 on the graph below in which periods of high volatility contrast 
with periods of low volatility. Particularly, the behaviors before 1980, during 1980-1995 
and after 1995 are remarkable. 
Another drawback of this approach is the lack of data. In theory, this approach works, all 
else being equal, when we have an infinite number of observations. The minimum number 
of observations that can reveal the properties of the phenomenon is generally unknown. 
Notwithstanding Basel II recommends at least one year period of historical observation for 
market risk. Concerning reduced-form models, the estimation is even worse provided that 
we have only one year horizon (that is yearly observations). 
 
 
Figure1: S&P 500 index. Prices and returns from 08/08/1951 to 04/09/2009. 
Source: yahoo finance 
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 2. Parametric models 
 
The idea is to infer model parameters for an assumed distribution of risk factors. 
Commonly the assumed distribution is tested on observations (Kolmogorov Smirnov test). 
In fact, temporal aggregation of the logarithm of absolute returns, for sufficiently large 
horizon and under other regularity conditions, are used to justify the normality of the 
logarithm of return during that period. 
In principle, central limit theorem works for infinite number of observations. Which is 
barely found in practice. Also, the large number of observations that can give a good 
approximation, specially for tail events, is unknown. Even provided a good number of 
observations, the central part of the distribution of the aggregate fit the Gaussian better 
than the tails. Bouchaud, J.P. and Potter, M (2000). Hopelessly, this makes the Gaussian 
approximation at the tails (the most important parts from a risk management viewpoint) 
less meaningful. 
 
3. Thought experiment 
 
We’ve seen that is difficult to estimate the distribution, especially at the tails. The 
implication is that  any prior distribution or posterior distribution may be wrong. In 
contrast to distributions usually assumed in practice (Gaussian, Student-t), this leaves room 
to a variety of distributions. So, any inferred distribution is to some extent subjective (L. J. 
Savage, 1962). Thus, the risk measure inferred from the analyst model might be very 
different from the true one (which is unknown due to the almost impossibility to determine 
the real distribution). In the following we consider the cases in which a risk manager, 
provided its distribution inferred, may end up. 
First, let us point that the VaR doesn’t give any protection for event with amplitude 
larger than VaR. We mean that, no matter the coincidence of the true and inferred VaR and 
how small are the likelihoods of events above VaR, still we aren’t immune at any time 
from catastrophic events. This is simply due to the randomness of the position and even 
worst when it shows up like an ergodic Markov process2 (meaning that a past catastrophe 
doesn’t reveal enough information which would help to its predictability). 
                                                 
2 Aperiodic recurrent markov process. 
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As we have seen before, the true distribution of a portfolio is basically unknown. Since 
there is no reason to confine the set of possible distributions to ‘bell curve’ and ‘Student-t’ 
distributions and, in general, to well-behaved distributions, we consider that a portfolio can 
in theory have any kind of distribution. To see the implication of this fact on risk control 
procedure, we consider two classes of distributions: 
• Type1 distribution, with finite mean and variance 
• Type2 distribution, with infinite or undefined mean and variance 
Also let assume the standard deviation as our risk measure. 
In situation where the real distribution is of type2, our portfolio is exposed to huge 
loss at any time. There is not safety margin that can reduce the risk we are bearing, because 
we expect catastrophic event at any time. In this case, the only strategies to mitigate the 
risk is to hedge it out, avoid short positions 3(especially in derivative markets) or simply 
exit from the market. 
When the distribution is of type1, traders would keep lower margin than required 
and banks would keep less capital than required if the inferred VaR is smaller than the true 
one. Which also means that they would be taking more risk instead of reducing it. 
 
 Besides some deficiencies given precedently , the assumption of efficient market 
hypothesis (which is key in VaR and structural models) has been seriously drawn into 
question. This leads us to the behavioral finance approach to decision under uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Let recall protection sellers in credit markets. 
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Chapter4. 
Behavioral finance 
 
 
Laboratory and real-life experiments have shown that not always decision-makers behave 
in a rational manner. Owing to limitations in processing information, agents often make 
choices different from what should be made given information available. Psychological 
biases arising from this process could be: 
• Cognitive bias, which is the judgmental distortion due to cognitive factors 
(cognitive dissonance, anchoring, framing, etc.)  
• Emotional bias, distortion due to emotional factors (greed, fear, etc.) 
 
In practice, there have been found many anomalies which are inconsistent with traditional 
finance settings. Some notable of them in financial markets are: 
• The value premium puzzle (price-earnings ratio effect): historical outperformance 
of value stocks over growth stocks 
• Size premium puzzle (small firm effect): historically, small capitalization stocks 
have outperformed large capitalization stocks  
• Equity premium puzzle: historically, equity has outperformed virtually default-free 
debt (government bonds). Mehra and Prescott (1985)  
• Under-reaction or over-reaction of stock prices to earnings announcement: stocks 
with higher past returns are overvalued and those with lower past return are 
undervalued. De Bondt and Thaler (1985)  
• Asset allocation puzzle: investors don’t hold the same composition of risky assets. 
Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997) 
• Price fluctuations with no information: Harris and Gurel (1986) found that there is 
an average abnormal return of 3.5% for stocks added to S&P 500. Another 
emblematic example is the stock market crash on Monday, 19, 1987 
 
Attempts have been made to explain anomalies met in decision making under uncertainty. 
We can recall the Bernoulli method in solving the St Petersburg paradox by a decreasing 
marginal utility of wealth. We also recall the rank-dependent model which, in order to 
explain Allais paradox, generalizes the expected utility by applying a cumulative 
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probability weighting function. The most satisfactory explanation of decision making is 
given by the cumulative prospect theory. 
 
1. Prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory 
 
Following the concept of irrational behavior, Kahneman and Tversky posited the Prospect 
Theory. Unlike the expected utility theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, which is a 
normative paradigm, the prospect theory is a descriptive pattern of decision making. 
According to this theory, the decision process follows two steps: 
• Editing phase 
• Evaluation phase 
 
The editing phase is the preliminary investigation. Prospects are reformulated. Outcomes 
and probabilities are transformed. The main operations during the editing stage are: 
• Coding, outcomes are perceived as gains and losses with respect to some reference 
point 
• Combination, simplification by combining probability with identical outcomes 
• Segregation, separation of the riskless component from the risky one 
• Cancellation, discarding common components to the prospects 
• Simplification, rounding outcomes and probabilities. Discarding highly uncertain 
outcomes 
• Detection of dominance, dominated prospects are discarded 
 
After the editing phase, which mostly alters preferences, prospects are evaluated. During 
the evaluation stage, weights are assigned to probabilities and values are assigned to 
outcomes. 
 
Values denote changes in a given portfolio, rather than final states of the portfolio. The 
value function (Figure2) has the following properties: 
• Concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses, although 
individual preferences can cause the shape of value function be the other way round 
• Loss aversion. That is, losses are  bigger threats than gains. This makes the function 
steeper in the domain of losses 
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Figure2: Utility function  
T ersky ahn  (1992) ut
ࢻ ൌ ࢼ ൌ ૙. ૡૡ and ࣅ ൌ ૛. ૛૞ 
v K eman ility function (blue line): ࢛ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ ൜െࣅሺെ࢞ሻ
ࢼ, ݔ ൏ 0
࢞ࢻ, ݔ ൒ 0
 
Haim Levy Enrico io gi and T
ࢻ ൌ ૙. ૛, ࣅ૚ ൌ ૟. ૞ and ࣅ૛ ൌ ૚૝. ૞ 
, Deg r horsten Hens (2003) utility function (black line): ࢛ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ ൜ ࣅ૛ࢋ
ିࢻ࢞ െ ࣅ૛, ݔ ൏ 0
െࣅ૚ࢋିࢻ࢞ ൅ ࣅ૚, ݔ ൒ 0
 
 
The weights are inferred from choices. They are not probabilities, since they don’t obey 
probability laws. The properties of the weighting function (Figure3), say π, are: 
• n of stated probabilities ߨ is an increasing functio
• ߨሺ0ሻ ൌ 0 and  ߨሺ1ሻ ൌ 1 
• Overweighting for small likelihood events and underweighting for the other events 
• Subcertainty 
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Figure3  (1992) p
࣊ሺ࢖ሻ ൌ ࢖
ࢽ
ሺ࢖ࢽାሺ૚ି࢖ሻࢽሻ૚/ࢽ
: Tversky Kahneman robability weighting function. 
.  ࢽ ൌ ૙. ૟ૢ for both gains and losses 
 
The prospect theory also accounts for many other situations like the shift of reference 
point, observed risk attitudes and cases in which probabilities are not provided (in these 
cases weights are linked to specific events). 
Later, the same authors proposed an extension of the prospect theory called the 
Cumulative Prospect Theory. The main features of the new version are: 
• Weights are linked to cumulative probabilities. So, it is applicable to uncertain as 
well as to risky prospects with continuous distribution. It is coherent with stochastic 
dominance. 
• Different decision weights for gains and losses 
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We have just seen that not always agents behave rationally and that it is well explained 
by Cumulative Prospect Theory. Next, we’ll see the implications of rational and irrational 
behaviors for price formation. For that we borrow the model in “Noise trader risk in 
financial market” by J. Bradford Delong et al.. 
 
2. Price formation with noise trader risk 
 
Let consider a market with two assets and two groups of agents, arbitrageurs and noise 
traders, with the following characteristics: 
• Every agent has a portfolio containing exclusively a safe and an unsafe assets 
• The unsafe asset supply is perfectly elastic, that is supply is variable when price is 
always fixed, with price one 
• Traders maximize their expected utility one period ahead 
• Arbitrageurs are expected utility maximizers with correct beliefs on prices 
• Noise traders are utility maximizers misperceiving the price of the risky asset 
•  Consistency between preference and trading. This is an important assumption for 
price formation. Because, as pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there is 
a possible inconsistency between choice and bid. That is, we can prefer something 
but act differently. 
 
Let call 
 ݌௧
 ଵ noise trader misperception of time t+1 risky asset price at time t 
 the price of the risky asset at time ݐ, 
߳௧ା
e proportion of noise traders 
4  
݊ th
sset hold by the noise traders ߙ௡௧ the share of the unsafe a
௡௧ noise traders perceived wealth at tim 1 ߱ e ݐ ൅
௧ାଵ  the real dividend per share at time ݐ ൅ 1 ݀
 ݎ the real risk free rate 
By definition, noise traders are investors mistaking noise for information Kyle (1985) and 
Black (1986); and arbitrageurs are investors with correct beliefs. 
                                                 
4 On occasion, just for rhetoric, we will replace 
• time t by today 
• time t+1 by tomorrow or next period 
• and time t-1 by yesterday or last period 
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Traders’ tomorrow perceived wealth is 
߱ ൌ ߙሺ݌௧ାଵ ൅ ߳௧ାଵሻ ൅ ߙ݀௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ݌௧ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ; 
 
 
note that ߳௧ ൌ 0 for arbitrageurs. 
Let assume that all traders have the same constant absolute risk aversion with utility 
function defined as 
ॼሺ߱ሻ ൌ െ݁ିଶఊ ఠ; 
 
 
where 2ߛ is absolute risk aversion coefficient. 
We stress that the latter assumption is not made only for seek of simplicity. As it has been 
demonstrated by Haim Levy, Enrico Degiorgi and Thorsten Hens (2003), this functional 
form does guarantee experimental findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and the 
existence of equilibra. 
We have 
ॱሾॼሺ߱ሻሿ 
 
ൌ ॱሾെ݁ିଶఊ ఠሿ 
 
ൌ ॱൣെ݁ିଶఊ ఈ௣೟శభିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟శభାఈௗ೟శభାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯൧ 
 
 
In our model, maximizing the expected utility one period ahead means that today traders 
evaluate tomorrow utility when they are already long the unsafe asset, they have 
information on tomorrow dividend and misperception (meaning that they are not uncertain 
at that time). 
Therefore  
ॱ୲ሾॼሺ߱ሻሿ 
 
ൌ ॱ୲ൣെ݁ିଶఊ ఈ௣೟శభିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟శభାఈௗ೟శభାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯൧ 
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ൌ ݁ିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟శభାఈௗ೟శభାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯ॱ୲ሾെ݁ିଶఊ ఈ௣೟శభሿ 
 
ൌ െ݁ିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟శభାఈௗ೟శభାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯݁ିଶఊ ఈఓ೟ା
ఙ೟
మሺଶఊ ఈሻమ
ଶ  
 
where ݌௧ାଵ|ݐ, have mean ߤ௧ and varian ; ߳௧ାଵ are known at time t. ce ߪ௧ଶ  ݀௧ାଵ and 
Agents maximize their expected utility, maxఈ ॱ୲ሾॼሺ߱ሻሿ, at the following number of shares  
ߙ ൌ
߳௧ାଵ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ
 
F
5 
 
Once determined the number of shares bought by both group of traders, now we see at 
which price they traded. For one unit of risky asset in the market, at equilibrium, we have: 
݊ߙ௡௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ሻߙ௔ ൌ 1 
 
 
Inserting arbitrageurs and noise traders’ shares into the preceding equation gives 
൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ሻ ఓ೟ାௗ೟శభି௣೟
ሺଵା௥ሻ
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ݊
ఢ೟శభାఓ೟ାௗ೟శభି௣೟ሺଵା௥ሻ
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ ൌ 1. 
 
 
Then, it results that the equilibrium price is 
 
݌௧ ൌ
ఓ೟ାௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ݊ ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ
ଵା௥
6 .
 
The above equation simply says that agents trade at a price which is the sum of: 
• Tomorrow dividend present value, ௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
  
െ ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ
ଵା௥
• Tomorrow price present value adjusted by its risk prem , ఓ೟
ଵା௥
ium  
• The present value of today noise trader misperception, ݊ ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
 
 
                                                 
5 Let note that  ߪ௧ଶ  must be non zero. Otherwise there is not equilibrium. Proof in Appendices.  
6 Derivation in Appendices. 
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The conditional expectation and volatility can be written with unconditional ones as 
follows  
ߤ௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ݖ௧ାଵ and ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ߪଶ ൅ ݓ௧ାଵ.  
 
 
Which means that  
 
݌௧ ൌ
ఓା௭೟శభାௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ݊ ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ
ଶఊ൫ఙమା௪೟శభ൯
ଵା௥
; 
 
where  ॱሾ݌௧ሿ ൌ ߤ and ܸܽݎሺ݌௧ሻ ൌ  ߪଶ. 
 
ݖ௧ାଵ and ݓ௧ାଵ denote respectively the uncertainty of expected price and the uncertainty of 
volatility. 
Moreover, we note that ݖ௧ାଵ and ݓ௧ାଵ are two random variables with respective means, 
ॱሾ݌௧ାଵሿ െ ॱሾ݌௧ሿ  and ܸܽݎሺ݌௧ାଵሻ െ ܸܽݎሺ݌௧ሻ. 
 
 
Let see how this affects the price by computing the first and second moments. 
For old generation of traders (to whom tomorrow dividend and misperception are 
uncertain), the dividend expected value is ݀௧ାଵതതതതതത with volatility ߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ  and noise traders’ 
misperception expected value is ߳௧ାଵതതതതതത with volatility ߪఢ೟శభ
ଶ . 
Let call 
ݖ௧ାଵതതതതത and ݓ௧ାଵതതതതതത  respectively expected values of ݖ௧ାଵ and ݓ௧ାଵ 
 
ߪ௭೟శభ
ଶ  and ߪ௪೟శభ
ଶ  respectively volatilities of ݖ௧ାଵand ݓ௧ାଵ 
 
 
Considering ݖ௧ାଵ, ݓ௧ାଵ, ݀௧ାଵ, ߳௧ାଵ independent we have 
  
ॱሾ݌௧ሿ ൌ  
ॱሾఓ೟ାௗ೟శభሿ
ଵା௥
൅ ݊ ॱ
ሾఢ೟శభሿ
ଵା௥
െ
ଶఊ ॱൣఙ೟
మ൧
ଵା௥
 ; 
 
which is equivalent to 
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 ߤ ൌ  ௗ೟శభ
തതതതതതത
௥
൅ ௭೟శభതതതതതത
௥
൅ ݊ ఢ೟శభതതതതതത 
௥
െ ଶఊ௪೟శభതതതതതതത
௥
െ ଶఊ ఙ
మ
௥
 . 
 
Concerning the volatility, we have 
ܸܽݎሺ݌௧ሻ ൌ
ଵ
ሺଵା௥ሻమ
൫ܸܽݎሺߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ାଵሻ ൅ ݊ଶܸܽݎሺ߳௧ାଵሻ ൅ ሺ2ߛ ሻଶܸܽݎሺߪ௧ଶሻ൯; 
 
 
hence  
 
ߪଶ ൌ
ఙ೏೟శభ
మ ାఙ೥೟శభ
మ ା௡మఙച೟శభ
మ ାሺଶఊ ሻమఙೢ೟శభ
మ
ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. 
 
The latter equation departs from the noise traders approach by De Long et al (1987) in 
which the assumption of prices process stationarity implies that changes in noise traders 
risk is compensated by change in fundamentals. 
Finally we get the price function 
 
݌௧ ൌ
ௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௗ೟శభ
തതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊఙ೏೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
൅ ௡ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௡ఢ೟శభതതതതതത 
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊ௡మఙച೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
൅ ௭೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௭೟శభതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊఙ೥೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
െ ଶఊ௪೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ ଶఊ௪೟శభതതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊయఙೢ೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
7 .
 
 This price functional form is separable in four main components: a dividend price, a 
misperception price, the price due to expected price uncertainty, and the price due to 
uncertainty of price volatility. 
• The dividend price, ௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௗ೟శభ
തതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊఙ೏೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. Which  is the sum of discounted next 
period dividend and its discounted continuation value  
൅
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
 
 and adjusted by the risk premium 
                                                 
26 
 
7 Note that discounting at risk free rate is coherent since it is applied to the certainty equivalent. For instance,  
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത െ 2ߛߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ  for uncertain dividend. So the valuation is risk-neutral (therefore, no-arbitrage). 
 െ
ଶఊఙ೏೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. 
 
This price is paid by investors if there were not noise traders in the market and the 
dividend payout is stable through time. 
• The misperception price, ௡ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௡ఢ೟శభതതതതതത 
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊ௡మఙച೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
.  
Which is the sum of discounted next period misperception and its discounted noise 
continuation value 
݊߳௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
 
 
 
 and the misperception risk adjustment (misperception risk premium) 
 
െ
ଶఊ௡మఙച೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. 
 
It says that the fundamental price can be distorted by investors sentiments. It’s the 
additional price asked by investors in case there are noise traders misperceiving the 
price through time. It may also explain the empirical findings of Mehra Prescot 
(1986) that market prices diverge from fundamental values.8 This component is 
central in our model. Therefore, let analyze more in details its implications. 
The fundamental price is affected when there are enough noise traders, i.e., ݊ must 
not be too small. This may be an explanation of the fact that prices fluctuate even 
when there are no information, Harris and Gurel (1986). 
The term ௡ఢ೟శభതതതതതത 
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
 represents the price pressure, the value due to average noise 
misperception. It can also be interpreted as the continuation value of noise. 
Because of the fact that noise traders can change their mind, investors ask a 
premium for the noise risk they are bearing regardless the uncertainty of 
fundamentals. This is also called “create space effect”, 
ଶఊ௡మఙച೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. 
                                                 
8 See also Roll (1984), Campbell and Kyle (1987). 
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൅ ௭೟శభതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
• The price due to the uncertainty (volatility) of expected price, ௭೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ
ଶఊఙ೥೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
. 
Although the price is affected by noise and fundamentals, the resulting price can be 
stationary if the effects from these two sources of risk compensate themselves. 
Therefore this component is also very important as it captures the fact that the 
combined action (from fundamentals and from noisy information)  is not expected 
to continue affecting the price like they are doing.  
The term ݖ௧ାଵ captures the future average behavior of fundamentals and next 
generations of traders. Thus, it’s essentially too difficult to estimate based on past 
information. In practice, the success in timing prices in the spot market depends 
essentially on the ability in guessing this component. 
• The price due to the uncertainty (volatility) of volatility of price, െ ଶఊ௪೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ
ଶఊ௪೟శభതതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊయఙೢ೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
 
 It represents the premium due to uncertainty in prices’ volatility. By its nature, it is 
a key driver of performance in derivative markets.9 
 
Relation to asset price modeling 
We saw in the first part of this paper that, in classical finance, returns are usually modeled 
on one risk factor (recall the diffusion process from which the famous Black-Scholes 
formula is derived). Moreover, it is often assumed that the risk factor has some stability 
properties through time hence allowing the application of statistical inference. 
Unfortunately, it is also well known that most of models fail in practice. Very often many 
estimation techniques assume that the future will be the same like the past, even parametric 
methods (like Montecarlo Simulation) still rely to some extent on the past to derive their 
parameters. Although other attempts have been made to improve the modeling of the 
behavior of asset prices (let mention mixed process like jump diffusion), we argue that 
they remain simply descriptive approaches. Their predictive power is still arguable mostly 
due to uncertainty of misperception. 
A behavioral approach like the noise trader risk model we analyzed above is very 
interesting because it segregates prices into two background factors. The advantage is huge 
                                                 
9 We know from the Black-Scholes-Merton’s fornula that derivatives instruments depend essentially on 
volatility. 
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as it helps to explain many classical theory inconsistencies found in practice and can help 
to better control the behavior of asset prices (at least from a risk management viewpoint). 
 
3. Measurement of sentiment 
 
Estimating investor sentiment is as difficult as estimating the fundamental value. 
Nonetheless, several approaches are proposed in literature and some of which are used by 
options traders for contrarian investment. Existing methods can be discriminated in 
market-based approaches and direct data surveys. Without going through the validity of the 
methods, in the following we sketch some of them. 
 
3.1. Market-based proxies 
i. Closed-end funds discount  
This was first observed by Charles Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard Thaler (1991) in 
“Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle". Realizing that closed-end 
funds10 trade at a premium when they are first introduced and at a discount latter, the 
claim that this can only be explained by investors misperceptions. Because, according 
to traditional theories the net asset value (NAV) must equal the market price of the 
fund. 
ii. Index based on new equity issue inconsistency with the law of one price, Welch, 
Ivo and Lily Qiu (2004); and IPO first-day returns or IPO volume. 
iii. Baker and Wurgler Sentiment index (2007) 
 It is an average of six measures: trading volume based on NYSE turnover, the 
dividend premium, the closed-end fund discount, first-day returns on IPOs, and the 
equity share in new issues (equity issues over equity plus long term debt issues). They 
argue that since single measures are not reliable, they can be averaged out to get a 
better proxy. 
 
3.2. Survey-based proxies 
i. University of Michigan consumer confidence index. The purpose is to estimate 
consumers’ current confidence in the economy. 
                                                 
10 Closed-end funds are investment companies that issue a fixed number of shares which are  then publicly 
traded. 
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ii. Yale school of management’s stock market confidence index. This method, 
designed by a group led by Robert Shiller, attempts to gauge investors sentiment. 
Questionnaires regard stock market outlook. 
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Chapter 5. 
Behavioral finance; market and credit risk measures 
 
 
1. Behavioral finance and Value at Risk 
 
So far, we have studied price and return behaviors in a market with noise traders. Now let 
check what does that involve from a risk management viewpoint. To that end, we first see 
how Value at Risk and the probability of default (in option-theoretic models) are affected. 
Let assume that all risk factors determining the return are bounded, we mean, with 
finite means and variances. Without this assumption, as we’ve seen in the thought 
experiment, the traditional risk measurement process is useless. Moreover we assume that 
the return has standard distribution ߶, ߙ is the confidence level, ̂ߤ௧ାଵ is the tomorrow 
estimated mean and ߪො௧ାଵ is the tomorrow estimated standard deviation from a sample with 
length ݉. 
The parametric Value at Risk is 
ܸܴܽ௧ାଵ ൌ െߤ௧ାଵ ൅ ߪ௧ାଵ߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ. 
 
 
Now, we compute the mean and standard deviation of the return. Yet for simplicity, we 
assume that we already know the initial price, ݌௧, when computing the VaR. Thus, the only 
risk factors are those of the final price ݌௧ାଵ. Therefore, the relative return between two 
periods is 
ݎ௧ ൌ
௣೟ష೛೟షభ
௣೟షభ
 
. 
 
Thus 
ݎ௧ ൌ
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೏೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೏೟శభതതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ഑೏೟శభ
మ ା௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శభച೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శభച೟శభതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ೙೟శభమ഑ച೟శభ
మ
஽೟షభ
 
൅
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௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೥೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೥೟శభതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ഑೥೟శభ
మ ିଶ௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆ം೟శభೢ೟శభିଶሺଵା௥ሻ∆ം೟శభೢ೟శభതതതതതതതതି଼∆ം೟శభయ഑ೢ೟శభ
మ
஽೟షభ
 
11  
 
So  
ߤ௧ାଵ ൌ ॱሾݎ௧ାଵሿ 
 
ൌ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ∆ௗ೟శమതതതതതതത െ 2∆ఊ೟శమఙ೏೟శమ
మ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ∆௡೟శమఢ೟శమതതതതതത െ 2∆ఊ೟శమ௡೟శమమఙച೟శమమ
ܦ௧
 
൅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ∆௭೟శమതതതതതത െ 2∆ఊ೟శమఙ೥೟శమమ െ 2ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ∆ఊ೟శమ௪೟శమതതതതതതത െ 8∆ఊ೟శమయఙೢ೟శమమ
ܦ௧
൅
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൫݀௧ାଶതതതതതത ൅ ݊௧ାଶ߳௧ାଶതതതതതത ൅ ݖ௧ାଶതതതതത െ 2ߛ௧ାଶݓ௧ାଶതതതതതത൯
ܦ௧
െ
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሺ݀௧ାଵ ൅ ݊௧ାଵ߳௧ାଵ ൅ ݖ௧ାଵ െ 2ߛ௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵሻ
ܦ௧
 
 
and 
 
ߪଶ௧ାଵ ൌ
൫௥ሺଵା௥ሻ൯
మ
ቀఙ೏೟శమ
మ ା௡೟శమమఙച೟శమ
మ ାఙ೥೟శమ
మ ାସఊ೟శమమఙೢ೟శమ
మ ቁ
஽೟
మ . 
 
The expected return just computed can be divided up in four main components: 
• A fundamental component 
 
ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೏೟శమതതതതതതതതା௥ሺଵା௥ሻௗ೟శమ
തതതതതതതି௥ሺଵା௥ሻௗ೟శభିଶ∆ം೟శమ഑೏೟శమ
మ
஽೟
, 
 
which is simply the fundamentals’ contribution to the return. 
• A component due to noise traders misperception 
 
ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శమച೟శమതതതതതതതା௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௡೟శమఢ೟శమതതതതതതି௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௡೟శభఢ೟శభିଶ∆ം೟శమ೙೟శమమ഑ച೟శమ
మ
஽೟
, 
 
                                                 
11 Derivation in Appendices. 
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Which is the misperception’s contribution to the return 
• A component due to uncertainty of expected price 
 
ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೥೟శమതതതതതതതା௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௭೟శమതതതതതതି௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௭೟శభିଶ∆ം೟శమ഑೥೟శమ
మ
஽೟
, 
 
That is the expected price uncertainty’s contribution to the return 
• A component due to uncertainty of volatility 
 
ିଶሺଵା௥ሻ∆ം೟శమೢ೟శమതതതതതതതതି଼∆ം೟శమయ഑ೢ೟శమ
మ ି௥ሺଵା௥ሻଶఊ೟శమ௪೟శమതതതതതതതା௥ሺଵା௥ሻଶఊ೟శభ௪೟శభ
஽೟
, 
 
that is the volatility uncertainty’s contribution to the return 
 
Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, it is obvious that  the risk measure would 
depend both on fundamentals and investors’ misperception. This hints us to analyze more 
in detail the goodness of VaR under a market with noise traders.12  
 Under market with no misperception by some investors, as it appears from the 
expected return and the volatility, Value at Risk would be a good measure since it 
increases with the riskiness in fundamentals and decreases with good expectations in 
fundamentals (all else being equal, we mean that the combined effect of uncertainty of 
expected price and volatility is negligible). However the estimated Value at Risk, as 
usually computed based on available information, may be still biased due the difficulty in 
estimating the uncertainty of expected price and price volatility. 
 Under markets in which prices satisfy our pricing function, Value at Risk decreases 
proportionally to the combined effect of price pressure and create space ߠ௧ାଵ (all else being 
equal); where 
 
ߠ௧ାଵሺܴ௧ାଵ, ܫሻ ൌ
ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శమച೟శమതതതതതതതା௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௡೟శమఢ೟శమതതതതതതି௥ሺଵା௥ሻ௡೟శభఢ೟శభିଶ∆ം೟శమ೙೟శమమ഑ച೟శమ
మ
஽೟
13 .
 
                                                 
12 an be considered as follow-up to our thought experiment. This section c
13 ߠ෠௧ାଵሺܴ௧ାଵ, ܫሻ, means that the systematic misperception depends on the exposure (ܴ௧ାଵ), current and future 
information (ܫ). Normally it includes also volatility uncertainty’s contribution to the return, since this 
component behaves in the risk measure like the expected return from misperception . But we assumed it is 
negligible just to highlight the effect of systematic noise trading. 
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We quickly realize that this combined effect is nothing but the misperception’s 
contribution to the return. 
The result is striking because it means that: 
• First, risk perception would be reduced when a bubble is booming. Since ߠ௧ାଵ 
would appear like an opportunity (positive cash flow) while being a hidden threat 
•  And second, the risk measure misinterpreting ߠ௧ାଵ would be an incentive to bubble 
We believe that this component might be significative for some assets (like glamour 
stocks). Its main properties are: 
• Homogeneousness. It is proportional to the exposure. 
• Translation invariant. It is not affected by a risk free asset 
• It is sub-additive. Because any position can be hedged out in complete market 
These features are crucial when it comes to defining and constructing coherent risk 
measures under behavioral framework.  
  Also, we can say from the mean and variance equations that the risk measure 
increases with risk aversion and proportion of noise traders. This suggests to redefine our 
risk measure in order  to include the  badly captured effect of noise trading. Hence, we 
propose the following adjusted market risk measure 
ܸܴܽ௧ାଵ ൌ െߤ௧ାଵ ൅ ߪ௧ାଵ߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൅ ߠ௧ାଵሺܴ௧ାଵ, ܫሻ.             (0) 
 
 
The latter measure can be easily translated to non parametric methods. In this case we’ ld 
have 
ܸܴܽ௧ ൌ െݎ௧כ ൅ ߠ௧כ  
 
 
where ݎ௧כ satisfies requirements in non parametric Value at Risk, and  
ߠ௧כ ൌ
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݊௧כ߳௧כ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ∆௡೟כఢ೟כതതതത െ 2∆ఊ೟כ௡೟כమఙച೟כ
మ
ܦ௧כ
 
 
 
 In practice, the measure used in parametric methods is the estimated Value at Risk. 
Thus, provided our pricing function, let see its implication to our traditional risk 
measurement process. We assume an estimation based on  method of moments. 
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 Method of moment estimation 
We know that the first moment estimator is 
 
̂ߤ௧ାଵ ൌ
∑ ௥೔
೘
೔సభ
௠
, 
 
the correct second moment estimator is 
 
ߪො௧ାଵ ൌ ඨ
∑ ሺݎ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሻଶ௠௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
 
 
and Value at Risk estimator is 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵ ൌ െ̂ߤ௧ାଵ ൅ ߪො௧ାଵ߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
 
 
where ݉ is the number of observations during the historical period. 
It is clear that, ahead of  high volatility period  these two moment estimators  would tend to 
be undervalued because they incorporate average past information. So, provided that the 
standard deviation estimator dominates the mean estimator, VaR estimator would tend to 
be undervalued ahead of high volatility period. 
 In the first section of this paper, we say that it is usually claimed that VaR is 
coherent in a Gaussian world (more generally in world where distribution is stable square-
integrable). Clearly, since the risk value is given by the estimator, the estimator coherence 
matters more than the measure coherence. Yet, we may not have diversification benefit 
even in a Gaussian world if the estimator is not appropriate (inferred or chosen such to be 
coherent). In the sequel we illustrate some evidences. To that end we use the method of 
mom ator and the GARCH(1,1). ent estim
Let ܺ ܽ݊݀ ܻ be our standardized exposures returns; ߣ a real number. ܺ ܽ݊݀ ܻ are 
Gaussians and not strictly positive, so we are left we sub-additivity, positive homogeneity 
and translation equivariant. 
 
VaR with method of moments 
We have 
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 ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺሻ ൌ െ
∑ ݔ௜
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
൅ ඨ
∑ ሺݔ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሻଶ௠௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
 
i. Translation equivariant 
We have 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺ ൅ ߣሻ 
 
 
൅
ඩ∑ ቆሺݔ௜ ൅ ߣሻ െ
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ߣሻ௠௜ୀଵ
݉
ൌ െ
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ߣሻ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
ቇ
ଶ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
ൌ ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺሻ െ ߣ 
 
 
ii. ve homogeneity Positi
When ߣ ൐ 0, we have 
 ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺߣܺሻ 
 
 
൅ ඨ
∑ ሺߣݔ௜ሻଶ௠௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
ൌ െ
∑ ߣݔ௜
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
ൌ ߣܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺሻ 
 
 
iii. Sub-additivity 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺ ൅ ܻሻ 
 
 
൅ ඨ
∑ ൫ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܺሻ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯
ଶ௠
௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
ൌ െ
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
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൅ ඨ
∑ ቀ൫ݔ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܺሻ൯ ൅ ൫ݕ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯ቁ
ଶ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
ൌ െ
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
ൌ െ
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
 
൅ ඨߪොଶ௧ାଵሺܺሻ ൅ ߪොଶ௧ାଵሺܻሻ ൅
2 ∑ ൫ݔ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܺሻ൯൫ݕ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯௠௜ୀଵ
݉ െ 1
߶ିଵሺ1
െ ߙሻ 
 
Thanks to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have 
 
൭෍൫ݔ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܺሻ൯൫ݕ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯
௠
௜ୀଵ
൱
ଶ
൑ ෍൫ݔ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܺሻ൯
ଶ
௠
௜ୀଵ
෍൫ݕ௜ െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯
ଶ
௠
௜ୀଵ
 
 
we deduce that 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺ ൅ ܻሻ ൑
∑ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻ
௠
௜ୀଵ
݉
 
൅ ൫ߪො௧ାଵሺܺሻ ൅ ߪො௧ାଵሺܻሻ൯߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ 
 
which is simply equivalent to 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺ ൅ ܻሻ ൑ ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܺሻ ൅ ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵሺܻሻ 
 
 
Hence, the VaR estimator with method of moments is coherent when the distribution is 
stable. 
 
VaR with GARCH(1,1) 
To show that VaR is not coherent, it is sufficient to show that the variance estimator is not 
homogeneous or translation equivariant. Again, let consider our standardized exposure ܺ 
and the positive real ߣ. Provided our variance estimator  
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ߪොଶ௧ାଵሺܺሻ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙݔ௧ଶ ൅ ߚߪොଶ௧ሺܺሻ, 
 
where ߱, ߙ and ߚ are defined in the usual manner 
We have 
ߪොଶ௧ାଵሺߣܺሻ ൌ ߱ఒ ൅ ߙఒሺߣݔ௧ሻଶ ൅ ߚఒߪොଶ௧ሺߣܺሻ. 
 
 
Like the optimization, the proof is essentially done numerically. 
 
Numerical evidence 
We consider 400 S&P500 returns sample from 04/09/2009 backward. We confront  
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺሻ  with ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺ10 כ ܺሻ. We get 
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺሻ  ൌ 0.02981085 
 
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺ10 כ ܺሻ  ൌ 0.2515701. 
 
 
We note that 
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺ10 כ ܺሻ  ൏ 10 כ ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺሻ. 
 
 
Hence the risk measure is not positive homogeneous 
This inequality says that risk increases less proportionally to the exposure size. Therefore 
alluding to some concentration benefit. Which is counter-intuitive. 
Also we have 
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺ ൅ 0.01ሻ ൌ 0.03021208  
 
 
We note that 
ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺ ൅ 0.01ሻ  ് ܸܽ෣ܴ଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽሺܺሻ െ 0.01 
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We just found that, in parametric estimation, the VaR estimator coherence is more 
important than the VaR coherence. We backed it with a numerical evidence.14 This can be 
easily extended to any parametric risk measure. 
 
 
2. Behavioral finance and probability of default in option-theoretic models 
 
The probability of default is the most important and difficult element to estimate in 
Merton-type models. In the following, we assume that assumptions in Merton-type are met 
(continuous time trading, diffusion process, etc…) and under a market with noise traders 
risk, we sound the effects on probability of de ult. fa
In this framework a company defaults at time ݐ when 
௧ܸ ൑ ܦ .                   (1) 
 
 
We also know that 
௧ܸ ൌ ܦ ൅ ܧ௧                   (2) 
 
 
where ܧ௧ is the company equity at time ݐ. 
From (1) and (2) we have 
ܧ௧ ൑ 0. 
 
 
Since 
ܧ௧ ൌ max ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܦ, 0ሻ, 
 
 
default is triggered when  
ܧ௧ ൌ 0.                     (3) 
 
 
                                                 
14 Using Boeing and Apple adjusted returns, we found numerically that the measure is sub-additive. Caveat: 
these findings are not to be generalized. 
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Equation (3) says that the company defaults wherever 
 
൅ ௗ೟శభ
തതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊఙ೏೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
൅ ௡ఢ೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௡ఢ೟శభതതതതതത 
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊ௡మఙച೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
൅ ௭೟శభ
ଵା௥
൅ ௭೟శభതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊఙ೥೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
ௗ೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ
ଶఊ௪೟శభ
ଵା௥
െ ଶఊ௪೟శభതതതതതതത
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ
െ
ଶఊయఙೢ೟శభ
మ  
௥ሺଵା௥ሻమ
ൌ 0                 (4) 
 
 
By definition the price is always positive. From the pricing function and equation (4) we 
see that even with strong fundamentals, with negligible impact of the third and fourth 
components of the pricing function, a negative price pressure (when noise traders are over-
pessimistic) may cause an unnecessary downgrade of the company. And a positive price 
pressure (when noise traders are over-optimistic) may unduly upgrade the company. The 
result is that traditional mark to market models (in which it is believed that the more liquid 
an asset is the better is), and in particular option-theoretic approach, are not reliable in 
presence of noise traders. 
Some empirical tests on  structural models have been conducted. For instance, it 
results from the test conducted by Young Ho Eom, Jean Elwege and Jing-Zhi Huang 
(2004) that probabilities are too low in Merton model. It would be premature to relate this 
fact to asset price behavior. Because, as we’ve seen earlier in VaR estimation, the risk 
element would depend also on the manner model’s parameters are estimated. 
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Chapter 6. 
Application 
 
 
1. Estimation technique 
 
We have seen that risk measurement process is a very ambitious task from a modeling and 
estimation viewpoint. Recently, new approaches are requested and some are emerging 
from the literature. Wilson Sy (2008) suggests that credit risks must be based on a causal 
framework. But, as also noted by John Maynard Keynes (1937), the complexity of 
financial and economic environment makes this approach almost impossible. The 
distribution and its estimate are in some extent based on weak assumptions. This makes the 
measurement process fundamentally a judgmental process. (L. J. Savage, 1962). As 
supported by John C. Hull (2007), since prices are affected by behavioral biases, risk 
models must be tempered with judgment and stress testing.  
 According to equation (0), VaR parametric estimation is reduced to the estimation 
of the mean ߤ, the volatility ߪ and the additional parameter ߠ, obviously with the 
distribution given a priori or already estimated. The new parameter ߠ in our proposed 
market risk measure which is driven by the systematic misbehavior of noise traders could 
be essentially estimated on judgmental basis. The mean is usually approximated as average 
of  observations in a given historical period or simply imposed by the analyst15. Contrary 
to the mean, there is a colorful literature on volatility estimation. It can be classified in 
historical volatility, GARCH-type volatility, implied volatility, stochastic volatility and 
realized volatility models (with related OHLC (open-high-low-close) volatility). As found 
by Torben G. Andersen et al.(1999) and Stephen Figlewski (2004), there is not a 
standard volatility estimator (neither an universal loss function). The estimator goodness 
criterion can be statistic (for instance, the root mean square or the mean absolute error) or 
economic (proportion of overestimation)16. The volatility estimator is ad hoc, we mean that 
it is chosen by the analyst according to the problem at hand. 
                                                 
15 See Black, Fischer (1976). 
16 For the predictability of volatility forecast, see Torben G. Andersen et al.(1999) and Stephen Figlewski 
(2004).  See Engle et al. (1993) and West et al. (1993) for economic criterion. 
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 Under some regularity condition (bounded prices’ process) we try to estimate the 
market risk of the S&P 500 index.17 In the following, we perform two tasks. First, to see 
the effect of sample size, we compare different daily-VaRs estimations. GARCH(1,1) 
VaRs with (sample sizes 10000, 400 and 30), Yang and Zhang VaR (with Yang and Zhang 
volatility estimator) and HL VaR (with a naïve estimator called HL estimator).18 Secondly, 
provided that we found that misperception which is an important risk factor is normally ill 
impounded in the traditional Value at Risk, we see how our VaR with 400 observations 
from 04/09/2009 backward is affected by the factor ߠ. Moreover, we use shorter period 
(one month) to estimate the moments of the distribution in the naïve estimator. This is 
because longer series tends to average out short term trends, affecting the first moment 
therefore. We mean that the effect of recent important information (like signals of high 
volatility periods) is mitigated with longer series.19 
 
HL VaR estimator: 
Regarding the distribution, the cumulative prospect theory says that it depends mostly on 
the weighs assigned by investors in a given market condition. Thus, it would normally be 
skewed towards positive returns in bull markets and negative returns in bear markets. 
Nevertheless, for simplicity and limited information about the true distribution, we 
consider that the distribution is Gaussian. Also, provided that we have limited information 
about returns’ process we assumed only extreme scenarios given by a historical period 
(one month in our case) to approximate the first and second moments. We get, 
ܸܽ෣ܴ௧ାଵ ൌ െ̂ߤ௧ାଵ ൅ ߪො௧ାଵ߶ିଵሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൅ ߠ෠௧ାଵሺܴ௧ାଵ, ܫሻ 
 
 
with 
̂ߤ௧ାଵ ൌ
݉ܽݔ൫ሺݎ௜ሻ௜ୀଵ,..,ଷ଴൯ ൅ ݉݅݊൫ሺݎ௜ሻ௜ୀଵ,..,ଷ଴൯
2
 
 
 
ߪො௧ାଵ ൌ ට
௠௔௫൫ሺ௥೔ሻ೔సభ,..,యబ൯
మ
ା௠௜௡൫ሺ௥೔ሻ೔సభ,..,యబ൯
మ
ଶ
െ ̂ߤ௧ାଵ
ଶ. 
                                                 
17 This choice is intentional. Because S&P 500 index reflects the most the risky asset in our model. 
18 See A. Saichev, D. Sornette and V. Filimonov (2009) for a comprehensive study on homogeneous OHLC 
estimators. 
19 Similar realized volatility approaches have been done by Merton (1980), Poterba and Summers (1986). 
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 Although this estimator may be inefficient (It would depend mostly on the sampling 
frequency. We mean whether with high frequency or low frequency data), we are 
compensated with some desirable economic features such as: 
• High sensitivity to extreme events and their signals (especially for high volatility 
periods).20 This is very important since these events are the essence of  Value at 
Risk. 
• sensitivity to mild events 
• Coherence. Obviously this measure is coherent. The proof is similar to the 
aforementioned method of moments 
• Flexibility. As we’ll be seen below, the conservativeness can be controled through 
an appropriate adjustment of the volatility 
 
2. Backtest: GARCH(1,1) daily-VaRs (with sample sizes 10000, 400 and 30) and 
daily-VaR with Yang and Zhang estimator. 
 
Backtests are from 05/01/1962 to 04/09/2009. Except for the one with sample size 10000 
which ranges from 16/10/1989 to 04/09/2009 due to sample length. 
Graphically, there is not a significative difference in GARCH(1,1) when changing 
sample size. Except that the smaller sample size seems to cover slightly better the left tail 
(represented by peaks in Figure4 in Appendices). Also, Figure4 and Figure5 do not 
indicate significative difference between models. Except the naïve estimator appears to be 
more conservative at the peaks.  
Now, we perform a statistical comparison between models based on a metric. Since 
an implicit economic requirement underpinning the VaR is to be more conservative in 
higher volatility periods a loss function we can appeal to is the Mean Conditional Absolute 
Distances21. Where it is defined as 
MCAD ൌ averageሾ|ሺVaR୲ ൅ r୲ሻ୬|;  |r୲| ൐ 1%ሿ  
 
 
                                                 
20 In accordance with Basel2, page200. 
21 The concept of Mean Absolute Distances, although copied from the Mean Absolute Deviation, is different 
in the sense that it is more economically orientated and it doesn’t represent an error. 
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In words, it is the average of the sequence given by the differences between VaRs and 
negative returns with amplitudes above a threshold value (1% in this case is arbitrary). The 
results are illustrated in the next table. 
Caveat: the volatility in Yang and Zhang is based on 2-days horizon, assuming a constant 
volatility during 2-days; and the mean is zero. 
 
Mean Conditional absolute distances 
 
Scaling 
parameter22 
VaR 
(10000) 
 
VaR(400) 
 
VaR(30) 
 
VaR VaR(HL) 
(Yang&Zhang)  
 
1 
 
0.01115671 0.01471326 0.01238488 0.008055 0.05914015
0.8 
 
- - - - 0.04415261
0.6 - - - - 0.02939166
0.5 
 
- - - - 0.02230908
0.4 - - - - 0.01588664
Table1: Mean Conditional Absolute Distances. 
 
As it appears in the table above, VaR(HL) is the most moderate and VaR(Yang&Zhang) is 
the less moderate. Scaling the volatility in VaR(HL) estimator with parameter ranging 
from 1 to about 0.4 reduces the conservativeness without losing other features (like 
covering the peaks with probability one). These results are consistent with features of the 
estimators and what have been seen graphically. 
 
3. Sensitivity analysis 
To check the fashion in which the risk measure can be affected by the misperception, let 
estimate the Adjusted Value at Risk of 05/09/2009 with Filter Historical Simulation. The 
                                                 
22 Scale parameter to render the HL-VaR estimator less conservative. 
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400 returns from 04/09/2009 backward are filtered through a GACH(1,1) with variance 
targeting. We obtain a non-adjusted VaR of 0.0357659. Then, adding arbitrary values of 
ߠ෠଴ହ/଴ଽ/ଶ଴଴ଽ  we get the table below. 
 
 
FHS Adjusted Value at Risk (to systematic noise misperception) 
ࣂ෡૙૞/૙ૢ/૛૙૙ૢ  -0.05 -0.02 0 0.02 0.05 
ࢂࢇࡾ෣ࣂ૙૞/૙ૢ/૛૙૙ૢ
 -0.0257659 0.0157659 0.0357659 0.0557659 0.0857659 
Table2: FHS Adjusted VaR, ࢂࢇࡾ෣ࣂ૙૞/૙ૢ/૛૙૙ૢ. ࣂ෡૙૞/૙ૢ/૛૙૙ૢ  is arbitrary. 
 
The ߠ෠ arbitrary values in the table are not far from possible real ones. In chapter4, we saw 
that fluctuations may be sometimes driven mostly by the misperception factor. A plausible 
evidence is documented by Harris and Gurel (1986). They found that there is an average 
abnormal return of 3.5% for stocks added to S&P 500. A value which is almost the double 
of risk value usually obtained through traditional models, even when performing an a 
posteriori measurement after a burst bubble. 
The negative risk in the second column is not surprising because it is the typical case of 
risk free positions, allowing risk reduction therefore.  But in our case above it may be the 
value of an undervalued asset. 
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Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper we went through the modeling process of market and default risk. We realized 
that it is not an easy task to get the clear representation of a phenomenon of interest. Even 
when we have an idea on its behavior, the used estimator matters the most in the final 
result. We construct a  simple estimator, based on judgment, that may be as useful as many 
classical estimators for market risk control. 
 Moreover we found that, under behavioral assumptions, risk measures must be 
revised to account for hidden risk due to systematic misperception. Although notions 
developed in this paper are ad hoc, they can be extended to other assets. We believe that a 
profound study of these concepts might improve the understanding of assets’ behavior and 
risk control. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Credit risk moment generation function with variable default rate  
For variable default rate 
 
࣪ሺtሻ ൌ ෍ Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏሿݖ௡
ஶ
௡ୀ଴
 
 
 ൌ ෍ ݐ௡ න Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏ|ܺሿ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴
ஶ
௡ୀ଴
 
 
ൌ න ෍ ݐ௡
ஶ
௡ୀ଴
Զሾ݊ ݂݀݁ܽݑ݈ݐݏ|ܺሿ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴
 
ൌ ׬ eሺ௧ିଵሻ௫ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴ . 
 
 
Assuming that ܺ~Γሺߙ, ߚሻ, i.e. fሺxሻ ൌ ୣ
షೣ
ഁ ୶ഀషభ
ఉഀ୻ሺఈሻ
, we have 
 
࣪ሺtሻ ൌ න eሺ௧ିଵሻ௫ fሺxሻ݀ݔ
ஶ
଴
 
 
ൌ න eሺ௧ିଵሻ௫
e
ି௫
ఉ xఈିଵ
ߚఈΓሺߙሻ
݀ݔ
ஶ
଴
 
ൌ ୻
ሺఈሻ
ఉഀ୻ሺఈሻሺଵାఉషభି୸ሻഀ
 
; by generalized binomial theorem 
ൌ
1
Γሺߙሻሺ1 ൅ ߚିଵ െ tሻఈ
 
 
 
ൌ ൬
1 െ q
1 െ tq
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൰
ఈ
 
 ൌ ሺ1 െ qሻఈ ෍ ൫௡ାఈିଵ௡ ൯ݍ
௡ݐ௡
ஶ
௡ୀଵ
  
 
where 
ݍ ൌ ఉ
ଵାఉ
 
. 
 
 
Finding share that maximizes expected utility function 
We have 
ॱ୲ൣെ݁ିଶఊ ఈ௣೟శభିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟ାఈௗ೟ାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯൧ 
 
 
ൌ െ݁ିଶఊ ൫ఈఢ೟ାఈௗ೟ାሺଵିఈ௣೟ሻሺଵା௥ሻ൯݁ିଶఊ ఈఓ೟ା
ఙ೟
మሺଶఊ ఈሻమ
ଶ  
 
Computing the derivative at ߙ 
߲ॱ୲ሾॼሺ߱ሻሿ
߲ߙ
 
 
 
ൌ 2ߛ ൫߳௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൯ െ 4ߪ௧ଶߛ ଶߙ 
 
thus  
߲ॱ୲ሾॼሺ߱ሻሿ
߲ߙ
 
ൌ 0 
2ߛ ൫߳௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൯ െ 4ߪ௧ଶߛ ଶߙ ൌ 0 
 
 
Which yields 
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ߙ ൌ
߳௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ  
 
Finding the equilibrium price 
݊ߙ௡௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ሻߙ௔ ൌ 1 
 
 
Is equivalent to 
݊
߳௧ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ሻ
ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ
 
ൌ 1 
 
൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ሻ
ሺఓ೟ାௗ೟ሻ
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ െ ݌௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ቀ
௡
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ݊
ሺఢ೟ାఓ೟ାௗ೟ሻ
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ ൅
ଵି௡
ଶఊ ఙ೟
మ
the same 
ቁ=1 
 
݊
߳௧
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ ൅
ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ െ ݌௧ ቆ
1 ൅ ݎ
2ߛ ߪ௧
ଶ
thus 
ቇ ൌ 1 
 
Hence 
݌௧ ൌ
ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧
1 ൅ ݎ
൅ ݊
߳௧
1 ൅ ݎ
െ
2ߛ ߪ௧ଶ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
 
Breaking down the equilibrium price in fundamental value and noise risk 
݌௧ ൌ
ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅ ݊
߳௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
െ
2ߛߪ௧ଶ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
݌௧ ൌ
ߤ௧ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ െ 2ߛߪ௧ଶ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
 
݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎ െ
2ߛߪ௧ଶ
ݎ൅ ݊
߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
ݎ െ 2ߛߪ௧
ଶ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
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݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎ െ
2ߛߪ௧ଶ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
ݎ൅ ݊
߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
ݎ
 
൅
݊߳௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ1 ൅ ݎ
 
݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത  
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
െ
2ߛߪ௧ଶ 
ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
െ
2ߛ൫݊ଶߪఢ೟శభ
ଶ ൅ ߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ ൯
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ
݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵ
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎ ሻ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵ ൅ ݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
 
 
൅
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
൅
݊ሺ߳௧ାଵ െ ߳௧ାଵതതതതതത ሻ
1 ൅ ݎ
݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത  
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
1 ൅ ݎ
 
െ
2ߛ൫݊ଶߪఢ೟శభ
ଶ ൅ ߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ ൯ 
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ
 
൅
݀௧ାଵതതതതതത
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
െ
2ߛߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ  
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ
െ
2ߛ݊ଶߪఢ೟శభ
ଶ  
ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻଶ
൅
݊ሺ߳௧ାଵ െ ߳௧ାଵതതതതതത ሻ
1 ൅ ݎ
݌௧ ൌ
݀௧ାଵ
1 ൅ ݎ
൅
݊߳௧ାଵതതതതതത 
ݎ
 
 
 
Return formula 
Let say 
∆ௗ೟ൌ ݀௧ െ ݀௧ିଵ   ∆ௗ೟തതതൌ ݀௧തതത െ ݀௧ିଵതതതതതത 
 
∆ఊ೟ఙ೏೟
మ ൌ ߛ௧ߪௗ೟
ଶ െ ߛ௧ିଵߪௗ೟షభ
ଶ    ∆௡೟ఢ೟ൌ ݊௧߳௧ െ ݊௧ିଵ߳௧ିଵ 
 
∆௡೟ఢ೟തതതൌ ݊௧߳௧ഥ െ ݊௧ିଵ߳௧ିଵതതതതതത  ∆ఊ೟௡೟మఙച೟మ ൌ ߛ௧݊௧
ଶߪఢ೟
ଶ െ ߛ௧ିଵ݊௧ିଵଶߪఢ೟షభ
ଶ . 
 
∆௭೟ൌ ݖ௧ െ ݖ௧ିଵ   ∆௭೟ഥ ൌ ݖ௧ഥ െ ݖ௧ିଵതതതതത 
 
∆ఊ೟ఙ೏೟
మ ൌ ߛ௧ߪௗ೟
ଶ െ ߛ௧ିଵߪௗ೟షభ
ଶ   ∆ఊ೟௪೟ൌ ߛ௧ݓ௧ െ ߛ௧ିଵݓ௧ିଵ 
 
∆ఊ೟௪೟തതതതൌ ߛ௧ݓ௧തതത െ ߛ௧ିଵݓ௧ିଵതതതതതത  ∆ఊ೟యఙ೏೟
మ ൌ ߛ௧ଷߪௗ೟
ଶ െ ߛ௧ିଵଷߪௗ೟షభ
ଶ  
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We have 
ܦ௧ ൌ ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݀௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݀௧ାଵതതതതതത െ 2ߛ௧ାଵߪௗ೟శభ
ଶ ൅ ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݊௧ାଵ߳௧ାଵ ൅
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ݊௧ାଵ߳௧ାଵതതതതതത െ 2ߛ௧ାଵ݊௧ାଵଶߪఢ೟శభ
ଶ ൅ ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻݖ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻݖ௧ାଵതതതതത െ
2ߛ௧ାଵߪ௭೟శభ
ଶ െ 2ݎሺ1 ൅ ݎሻߛ௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵ െ 2ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻߛ௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵതതതതതത െ 8ߛ௧ାଵଷߪ௪೟శభ
ଶ . 
 
 
therefore 
ݎ௧ ൌ
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೏೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೏೟శభതതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ഑೏೟శభ
మ ା௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శభച೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೙೟శభച೟శభതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ೙೟శభమ഑ച೟శభ
మ
஽೟షభ
 
൅
௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆೥೟శభାሺଵା௥ሻ∆೥೟శభതതതതതതതିଶ∆ം೟శభ഑೥೟శభ
మ ିଶ௥ሺଵା௥ሻ∆ം೟శభೢ೟శభିଶሺଵା௥ሻ∆ം೟శభೢ೟శభതതതതതതതതି଼∆ം೟శభయ഑ೢ೟శభ
మ
஽೟షభ
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Figures 
 
 
Figure4: Backtest of GARCH(1,1) VaRs (with sample sizes 10000, 400 and 30). 
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Figure5: Backtest of GARCH(1,1) (with sample size 400), Yang & Zhang and HL VaRs. 
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